Tuesday, April 29, 2014

Mysterious Epistemology and Metaphysics part 1

It is probably impossible to convince me of anything. The reason is rather simple. I cannot trust the efficacy of any mechanism that requires itself to understand itself. As a result, I cannot trust, truly, anything that the mechanism claims to understand. Yet, this is itself one of many paradoxes one arrives at following this line of logic.

Yet, it may not be a problem at all. In fact, I'm inclined to think that this infinite conundrum could be the very essence of the evolution of any being that uses a mechanism comparable to our own. In light of this, perhaps I should define this mechanism... (indeed, there are already many terms I must attempt to define to try to render anything I've already said, and anything I will henceforth say into any clarity whatsoever). I will try first then to define the said mechanism, commonly referred to as "mind."

The human mind is a mechanism that wields reason as its weapon in the fight between itself and reality. The battle is waged with interpretation (or perception, though these two terms are generally distinct) and is ostensibly the means to reality's end. The "end" of reality is that which one perceives as reality. It isn't hard to see the circularity inherent in this definition; I'm afraid you will have to set aside your qualms with circular thinking in order to attempt a charitable grasp at what I'm trying to articulate. Mind is thus that which contains reason. Any notion of "mind" beyond that is merely suggesting something different than I am in this instance. Of course, we are beholden to the assumptions we make, and such assumptions are merely the interpretations of our mind-using-reason.

Reality is thus the result of the battle between mind and reality. I like the describing it as a battle for, if anything, an entertaining reason; societies are doomed if they do not determine what is considered reality for most in the society, for they would then be forced to concede to any or all interpretations, and would therefore have no basis upon which to establish codes of conduct and rules of law (relativism). There are indeed problems with this formulation, but we must try to do away with certain things in principle, and allow how things operate in practice to be sufficient frameworks within which to operate.(Not all reality is created equal of course. If this is your argument against what I've said so far, I must implore you to allow the argument to unfold). Mind makes reality, reality is codified, societies operate. Take for instance Kant's categorical imperative, which states that one cannot make universal a law that contradicts what the society determines to be "obligation." Do not steal if you cannot say faithfully that stealing should be a universally allowable behavior. Society would at least cease to exist in whatever current iteration it exists in at the time. That interpretation of reality is standard because any other interpretation of that phenomenon jeopardizes social order. What constitutes effective social order, and whether or not Kant's ethical principles are valid is not the point, but points to the notion that it is at least sufficient that people agree, by and large, to a somewhat standard view of reality to maintain social order. As far as Kant is concerned, and the notion of social order, I will tackle these problems later on.

Let us remind ourselves of what has been said so far. Reason cannot be trusted, yet, reason is required for understanding, therefore, we gaze deeply into the manifold of paradoxes. The mind uses reason to attempt to avoid such paradoxes by engaging reality with its interpretation of that reality. The paradoxical nature of such a mechanism emerges because in effect, mind cannot use reason to understand reason, and thus any interpretation of reality is problematic. It is easy, and convenient to brush aside this problem with many a philosophical trick, yet I remain unconvinced. Perhaps I am not intelligent enough to confidently implement any of the major philosophical strategies and derive a compelling solution. Yet, perhaps there is no mind intelligent enough at all to do so.

Above, it is claimed that the paradoxical nature of reason could be the primary engine of the evolution of whatever being that engages with reality as stated previously. To unpack this notion, it is helpful to attempt a definition of "evolution," given its hefty connotative baggage. Firstly, we must assume (every notion is an assumed notion) that beings with comparable mechanisms such as ours at least desire, on some level (primitive or otherwise) their own progress. Progress can be construed as that phenomenon which a reasonably ordered society strives toward in its overall state of affairs. Astute readers might have noticed that as a result of this particular assumption, evolution and progress are related but distinct dynamic phenomena. They differ in one important way; progress is relative to a society's interpretation of its reality; evolution is all-encompassing progress, and may or may not include, or even "agree" with the society's interpretation of its own progress (here we see another iteration of the paradox of reason). With that distinction in mind, we might also want to assume that there is indeed an evolutionary trajectory. Again, it is important to remember that whatever understanding reason comes up with to interpret such an evolutionary trajectory must be held under close scrutiny and suspicion. The conclusion to this line of thinking, while it is what I am striving to achieve currently, still does not convince me ultimately that such truths can be known. Nonetheless, it is clear at least that there is progress in the universe. If that is the case, then perhaps there is indeed an inherent teleological "forwardness" carrying itself out.

I will have to now concede absolutely to the notion that the nature of the universe is unknowable to reason. In light of the above, hopefully the manner in which this concession is made is coherent. Notice, I have until now avoided making any theological claims. I will try to tackle some theological issues moving forward. First, whether or not God is an adequate solution to the epistemological problem of interpreting reality depends on whether or not God exists. This is itself an epistemological problem of interpreting reality, and thus cannot be adequately engaged using reason. Some might then employ the notion of faith in response to this problem, and while the jury is most certainly out on this question, I have no qualms with concluding that it is paradoxical by virtue of its notional existence, in the same way that any concept is reducible to paradox. For example, to say that something exists is to suggest something true about reality. If truth about reality is subject to the interpretation of reason as stated above, then such truth is at best a place holder for potential truth. If such place holders can be allowed to exist, then all interpretations of reality have equal access to placing whatever notion in as a place holder for whatever cannot be explained or understood through reason. This is paradoxical, because the suggestion that all interpretations of reality are valid defies reason, and reason is the cause of any interpretation of reality.

A counter to this line of thinking might attempt to place any of the previous assumptions made above about the nature of reason in the same category as things that exist through faith--in the "place holder" position as something that only might exist, and because one cannot access it through reason, then it must exist in another realm of existence (or some such formulation). But to say that something both is, and is not, is incoherent to reason. Only when we add qualifications to that undefined something are we able to force it out of nonexistence. Thus, we cannot say something exists through "faith" with any more confidence than anything else that might exist through faith or reason. If something "is" because of "faith," then it no longer occupies a space out of reach of reason's interpretive grasp. And yet, this very move is subject to fall into the same trap, for it requires reason, and reason cannot be trusted with matters of understanding reality. Another way to look at it, is to examine more closely the notion of faith. One might have faith in something, which at first glance doesn't seem like quite the same thing as faith about unknowable existence. Faith in something brings that something into existence as a desired interpretation of reality. But, the fact that if I have faith that I am healthy enough to not get cancer, does not render out of existence the possibility that I might get cancer. If that is the case, then an odd thing happens. Faith about the existence of God is just as ineffective; just because it is bringing something from beyond the realm of interpretative existence, does not give it adequate space to exist outside of becoming a mere "place holder" for something that cannot be known. It seems then, that faith is actually a form of reason, for it requires both realities to be true and false in the same instance, and is thus paradoxical.

To be continued.
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